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The aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact that the anti-crime program 
Comuna Segura: Compromiso 100 had on the reporting rate of different types 
of crimes. This program, implemented in Chile starting in 2001, was very highly 
criticized and, therefore, was eliminated in 2006. This paper provides statistical 
evidence, using the impact assessment methodology, which shows that the program 
was successful in increasing the reporting rate in targeted municipalities and 
also in decreasing levels of crimes associated with other crimes, such as rape. 
All this underlies the importance of carrying out formal impact assessments 
in order to determine benefits that are associated with a particular program. 
However, financial issues are also very important too and it is necessary to take 
them in account when making a fair statement about the cost-effectiveness of 
the program. This point is, however, not addressed in this paper but should be 
kept in mind in order to have a complete picture of the program.
Key words: Crime, Program evaluation, Matching.
Resumen
El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en la evaluación del programa antidelin-
cuencia Comuna Segura implementado a partir del año 2001, el cual fue muy 
criticado y, por ende, eliminado en el año 2006. En este artículo se presenta Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 2 370
evidencia estadística, utilizando la metodología de evaluación de impacto, 
que muestra que el programa fue exitoso en aumentar las tasas de denuncia 
de ciertos tipos de delitos en las Municipalidades beneficiarias, y también en 
reducir otros delitos como violación. Todo esto recalca la importancia de llevar 
a cabo evaluaciones de impacto con el objetivo de determinar los beneficios 
asociados a un programa en particular. No obstante lo anterior, es importante 
también analizar los aspectos financieros del programa para establecer de 
una manera más precisa la efectividad del mismo. Este punto no es abordado 
en este artículo pero debe tenerse presente al analizar integralmente el efecto 
que tuvo el programa.
Palabras clave: Crimen, Evaluación de programas.
JEL Classification: J18, K14, K42.
1. Introduction
Various opinion surveys indicate that crime is seen as one of the principal 
problems facing Chilean society today. A Fundación Chile XXI publication 
states “…alongside poverty and unemployment, public safety has been one of 
the most worrying problems voiced by respondents across all opinion surveys.” 
Meanwhile, in a recently published report, ADIMARK reports that crime was a 
key public concern throughout the 1990s, remaining among the top five priori-
ties of public interest. Between 1990 and 1994, it was the number one public 
concern1.
Despite the relevance of crime as a major problem for Chilean society, there 
is very little empirical evidence available. Nevertheless, some studies, using a 
cross-country database (Loayza et al. 2002), found that crime and inequality 
rates are positively correlated. they specifically show that the causality relation-
ship goes from inequality to crime rates. Similarly, Villavicencio and Molina 
(2002), using the Becker-Ehrlich model for a regional analysis for Chile, find 
that socio-economic and demographic variables are determinants of crime rates. 
these authors also indicate that economic cycles affect the probability of crimes 
being committed.
Several specific anti-crime proposals have not yet been evaluated. Examples 
of these are the Penal Reform Process and the Plan Cuadrante of the police2. 
1  ADIMARK is one of the most important Chilean consulting companies in market research 
and public opinion.
2  the Penal Reform Process was a fundamental change of the judicial system which became 
a system based on a procedure accusatory and oral accounts. On the other hand, the Plan 
Cuadrante is a preventative police surveillance strategy, aimed at progressively satisfying 
the increasing public demand for security. It is a differentiated, equitable and technical 
way of allocating human and material resources in the population, through close links 
and communication with the community. It is currently in operation with 251 Cuadrantes 
or quadrants in all the municipalities of the jurisdictions of the six Santiago Operational 
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the former aims to speed up the legal process and the application of the law in 
crime cases while the latter aims to reduce crime rates directly.
the program Comuna Segura: Compromiso 100 was implemented in Chile 
in 2001. At first it was applied only to twelve municipalities, but over time it 
expanded3. this program, like others of a similar nature, has not been formally 
evaluated, and its effects have been evaluated from only a judicial perspective. 
this paper makes a contribution to the evaluation of the program.
Beyer and Vergara (2006) suggest a complete reformulation of the program, 
since it was not addressing the root of the issue, namely the initiation of teens 
into crime. Considering the situation in 2006, the authorities of the time chose 
to close the program. this study, however, provides evidence that the Comuna 
Segura program would have increased the reporting rate of certain types of 
crimes, particularly those with a gap between the crime rate and the reporting 
rate also known as “dark figure”. It also shows that it would have reduced other 
types of crimes. these results are stable and robust to different specifications 
and methodologies.
Vergara (2009) analyzes the impact of the Comuna Segura program and the 
Plan Cuadrante using panel data. the results show that only the Plan Cuadrante 
was successful in terms of reducing the crime rate, while the Comuna Segura 
program had no impact based on the original objectives. this paper provides 
evidence which is complementary to Vergara (2009) in two aspects. First, the 
techniques and the data set used in this paper have obvious advantages compared 
to using region panel data set. Second, Vergara uses crime rates which are the final 
outcome about the public cares about. However, to correctly evaluate Comuna 
Segura, one must look at the reporting rate. the program has the objective of 
increasing the crime reporting rate. the reduction in crime rate is explained by 
many factors including increased reporting. therefore, we use this outcome as 
the variable most closely related to the main goals of the program.
there are several crime prevention programs in the world, most located in 
developed countries. For instance, in the United States there is the Portland’s 
Crime Prevention Program, and in the United Kingdom there is the National 
Community Safety Plan. In short, these programs are designed to get neighbors 
involved in community policing efforts. these community partnerships are aimed 
at reducing crime at the neighborhood level. In all of these cases, the communities 
are at the heart of the plan. However, still there is little evidence of the effects 
related to such interventions, specifically for developing countries.
its surveillance to a particular group of police or Carabineros which is determined by the 
specific security needs and characteristics of the sector, so that the same police officers 
patrol the sector everyday and thus get to know the community, strengthening the bonds 
of trust and cooperation. Its ultimate objective is to consolidate links with the community 
and to increase the police presence on the streets. Some of the main objectives of this in-
novative system are to rationalize and optimize the use of institutional funds, to maximize 
the coverage provided by preventative vigilance, reduce response times for citizen needs 
and increase personalized contact with the community and community organizations. In 
this system, the participation of the local community is fundamental to support the work 
of the police in their mission of ensuring public security.
3  More details are available in Dammert and Lunecke (2004).Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 2 372
the evidence suggests that the municipalities enrolled in the program have 
increased reporting rates of the crimes related to theft. this is consistent with the 
dark figure being elevated in these crimes, because victims often do not report, 
probably due to the cumbersome procedures or the value of the item stolen. 
Unfortunately, the estimates also show that the program had a negative effect 
on reports of rape. Assuming the dark figures of this type of crime are low, the 
negative impact of the program may be related to a decrease in this type of the 
crime, which we assume is due to the dissuasive effect of the program. However, 
further research is needed for a conclusive result.
Finally, in the program design, Comuna Segura seeks to increase social 
networks. However, we do not have sufficient empirical evidence to support 
that hypothesis. In particular, we found significant effects only in the short run. 
this finding may be explained by two potential reasons: the financial component 
of the program is very important and that the program may not create social 
capital in the long run.
the paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, section 2 explains 
the details of the Comuna Segura program and provides information concerning 
its implementation. Section 3 presents the key characteristics of the municipal 
variables that are considered relevant for this analysis. Section 4 shows the para-
metric and non-parametric estimates of the program’s effects. It also presents 
some test of the robustness of the results founded. Finally, the main conclusions 
may be found in section 5.
2.  The Comuna Segura Program
the Comuna Segura: Compromiso 100 program is a Ministerio del Interior 
and Fundación Paz Ciudadana joint-program4. the two main objectives of this 
program are to: create a crime prevention and control system that promotes 
citizen participation by means of citizen security councils. these councils allow 
the security concerns of the residents to be aired and coordinates the various 
anti-crime initiatives in the municipality. Second, to create a financing system 
that coordinates the use of existing resources and to deliver new resources to 
community security projects through open competition for funds. this program 
had an investment fund, where 70% was used as competitive funds to finance 
projects submitted by social organizations. the other 30% was invested in proj-
ects submitted by municipalities to work specific issues selected as priorities by 
the Councils. In 2005, of the municipal initiative projects were consolidated, 
which delineated four strategic issues: domestic violence, neighbor mediation, 
school coexistence, and children and adolescents at risk.
through these funds, communities would have had the necessary resources 
to implement the initiatives they want to combat their crime problems5. One 
4  Fundación Paz Ciudadana is a non profit organization that has as a main aim to contribute 
to the improvement of the public policy in terms of reduction of crime.
5  the citizen security councils are chaired by the Mayor of the municipality and are made 
up of the Carabineros Police and the Criminal Investigation Department of Chile, coun-
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of the functions of the citizen security council is to promote, through educa-
tion and training, participation in the development, execution and evaluation 
of projects, as well as holding community meetings to keep citizens informed 
and to get feedback.
Finally, these councils should have an active role in gathering, process-
ing and disseminating relevant information by carrying out a diagnosis of the 
current local issues related to crime prevention and control. they should also 
disseminate and promote the financing options available, as well as related 
projects and developing a communicational strategy to ensure the population 
is well informed of the security measures being taken.
to sum up, the objective of the program is to generate information (increas-
ing the crime reporting rates) and to negotiate between the community and the 
respective authorities in order to produce social networks that can help fight 
crime. Hence, the main contribution of the program is through its effect on crime 
reporting rates, more than directly on actual crime. this rests on the precept 
that there are a significant series of both monetary and subjective costs for the 
victims of crime block the reporting of actual crimes committed6.
the program started in twelve municipalities nationwide in March 2001: 
El Bosque, La Pintana, Lo Espejo, Renca, Santiago, San Bernardo, Copiapó, 
Coronel, Ovalle, San Pedro, Valdivia and Valparaíso. table 1 shows the municipali-
ties selected and the total funds allocated. In 2002, and using the same criteria, 
the program spread to another twelve municipalities: Cerro Navia, Estación 
Central, Macul, Pudahuel, San Miguel, San Ramón, Melipilla, Calama, Linares, 
San Antonio, Talca and Talcahuano. Eventually, the program incorporated 70 
municipalities nationwide.
Formally, the relationship between crime reported and the level of crime can 
be proposed (and given another set of socio-economic variables). this relation 
allows us to measure the effects of a program like Comuna Segura as:
(1)   DD PCPX = (,() |)
where D is the crime reported over a defined period and place, P is a dichotomous 
variable that represents the program, C is the rate of previously non-observed 
crimes that can be influenced by the program and X is a vector of various 
controlled socioeconomic characteristics that could affect the municipal crime 
reporting rates7.
local business, education and health sectors of the area. As the new penal reform process 
progressed, the respective district attorney would be incorporated into these councils and 
a technical secretary was added as a consultant.
6  this will naturally depend on the type of crime. Evidence indicates that crimes such as 
robbery have a relatively low reporting rate. On the other hand, homicide has a nearly 
100% reporting rate. this could be proof that people have low return expectations in 
getting back their goods lost in a robbery relative to the cost of following through with a 
case. the relation is different when it comes to homicide due to the moral duty to know 
the truth. 
7  Noteworthy among these are inequality, unemployment rate, and average schooling of 
the population.Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 2 374
We shall assume that all the variables described are continuous8. thus, a 
change in the program variable could produce the following effects on the crime 
reporting rates:
















where dD / dP is the change in the crime reporting rates in the community over 
a given period when the program variable changes (for example, from a zero 
value, from not belonging to one, to belonging to one). the first term to the 
right of equality could be interpreted as the change in the “social environment” 
directly associated with the program. this effect is assumed to be independent 
of actual crime rates. In other words, a large part of what the Comuna Segura 
program seeks to achieve as previously stated. the program also has a second 
indirect effect on crime reporting rates through the actual crime rates that it is 
summed up in the second term.
In theory, if the program had a significant effect on crime levels, this last 
term would be negative. the worst case scenario might be the non-existence of 
such a relationship, that is ∂C / ∂P = 09. On the other hand, a positive relation 
between crime levels and reporting rates would be expected (∂D / ∂C > 0). thus, 
the indirect effect of the program on reporting rates compared to crime rates 
would be expected to have a negative correlation, or at least a value of zero.
8  this assumption does not affect the conclusion objectives of this exercise in any way.









San Pedro de la Paz 187,390 7.3
Valdivia 200,795 7.9
El Bosque 257,872 10.1
La Pintana 296,712 11.6
San Bernardo 230,571 9.0
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After linking both effects to the reporting levels associated with the program, 
it can be shown that the aggregate effect does not have a predictable sign10. On 
one hand, if dD / dP is greater than zero, the impact through improvement in the 
“environment” more than compensates the decrease in reporting produced by 
the crime decrease associated with the program. On the other hand, if dD / dP is 
less than zero, the effect of the program would mainly be on actual crime rates 
and its effect on the “environment” would be comparatively less.
Consequently, as may be expected, the Comuna Segura program would have 
a positive value derived from the equation (2) if the program had a positive ef-
fect11. the rest of this paper examines the latter hypothesis12.
Nevertheless, before continuing, it is necessary to state some precautions. 
In the first place, the public cares about the crime rate, not the crime reporting 
rate. However, it is, of course, important to have crimes reported in order to 
solve them. Moreover, since each arrest takes one criminal off the streets, it 
may deter future crime. On the other hand, it should be noted that the difference 
between the crime rates and reporting rates, the dark figure, varies based on the 
type of crime. thus, while it is likely that the reporting rates of homicide and 
rape are very high, lesser crimes, such as theft, have a significant dark figure. 
that is why a positive effect of the program on the reporting rate of thefts can be 
interpreted as a decrease in this dark figure. In contrast, a negative effect of the 
program on the reporting rate of rapes could be interpreted as a decrease in the 
crime rate, for its effect on the dark figure would be null (what was happening 
was already being reported).
3.  Data
there are two sources for the data in this study. First, the crime rate in-
formation was provided by the Ministerio del Interior, which is measured on 
the basis of crimes reported per 100,000 inhabitants. this study utilized the 
information available for the first quarters of 2001 and 2002. Second, in order 
to control for municipal characteristics information available in the CASEN 
(Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional) 1998 and 2000 surveys 
is used13. CASEN is a cross-sectional survey with national representation and 
it is a fundamental tool for social policy in Chile, because it contains valuable 
information about Chilean households regarding housing, education, health 
and labor characteristics. Based on this survey, socioeconomic indicators can 
10  Both directly through the environment and indirectly through number of crimes 
committed.
11 A  dD / dP value equal to zero may suggest that both effects are perfectly compensated 
–very improbable– or that the program had no significant effects on crime reporting 
rates.
12  As noted before, the program Comuna Segura: Compromiso 100 was structured through 
different measures to encourage crime reporting. the aim of this paper is then to evalu-
ate this group of measures, and how they altered (if they did at all) municipal reporting 
rates.
13  Additionally, the 1998-2000 characteristic differences are controlled by the fixed effects 
that exist on a municipal level for the years 2001-2002.Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 2 376
be established on the municipality level, which allows us to complement the 
reporting rate information.
table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the variables for the municipalities in-
cluded in the program (beneficiaries) as well as for those that were not (control)14. 
the table shows that the beneficiary municipalities have comparatively lower 
levels of inequality, higher school attendance rates, higher unemployment rates, 
lower per capita income and a higher population density15.
Panel b of table 2 shows the 2001-2002 variations on reporting rates (per 
100,000 inhabitants) of five types of crime: theft, aggravated theft, theft with 
force, rape and homicide16. Reporting rates of theft and theft with force increased, 
both in beneficiary and non beneficiary municipalities. the sharp increase in 
the reporting of theft with force in beneficiary municipalities is particularly 
remarkable. On the other hand, there was a decrease in reporting of aggravated 
theft, rape and homicide. However, the variation is practically zero in the case 
of homicide.
Considering the available information, it can be concluded that the two 
municipality groups (beneficiary versus non beneficiary) are different, and 
14  the total number of beneficiary municipalities was twelve while there were 82 controls. 
All had to have over 70,000 inhabitants for inclusion in the program.
15  Apart from having populations of over 70,000 inhabitants, the selection criteria for inclu-
sion in the Comuna Segura program included the poverty index, theft with force and the 
aggravated theft rates per 100,000 inhabitants of the municipality.







Quintil ratio 12.77 12.58
% of non attendance at school (5-18 years old) 7.83 8.14
Unemployment rate 10.22 13.33
Per capita income/median  1.62 1.52
% municipalities with Reforma Procesal Penal 13.41 16.66
Population density (Pop./km2) 2,907.65 5,113.61
2002-2001 variations on crime reporting rates
theft 6.14 27.86
Aggravated theft –7.33 –3.07
theft with force 20.27 42.85
Rape –0.41 –2.07
Homicide –0.08 –0.16
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therefore, a simple comparison of reporting rates would not identify the causal 
effect of the program.
4.  Program Impact Estimates
this section presents the methodology used in evaluating the effects of the 
Comuna Segura program on municipal crime reporting rates. In order to identify 
the effects of the program this study has focused on the following crimes: theft, 
aggravated theft, theft with force, homicide and rape.
As mentioned earlier, to analyze the robustness of the results, two alternative 
evaluation techniques have been implemented. Firstly, parametric estimates are 
calculated through a difference-in-difference analysis. Second, non-parametric 
matching-type estimators are applied as described below17.
It is possible to consider the decision to participate in the Comuna Segura 
program as a latent variable that is influenced by a vector of characteristics, so 
one must observe whether the municipality participates or not in the program 
(C) which is a dummy variable.
More formally, let Y1 be the reporting rate of a beneficiary municipality of 
the Comuna Segura program, and let Y0 be that of a non beneficiary municipal-
ity. then we have the following set of equations that describe the behavior of 
the variable reporting rate:








It is important to note that econometrician could observe the municipality 
just in one state, as beneficiary or as a non beneficiary. Hence he only observes 
the following:
   YC YC Y =+ − 10 1 ()
Handling the above expression, we come to:
   YY YY C =+− 01 0 ()
Assuming the case of homogeneous treatment effect () UUU 01 == we 
can arrive to:
   YC U =+−+ µµ µ 01 0 ()
this least squares approach helps us identify the average treatment effect 
(ATE) assuming that there are no differences in non observables. In fact, in 
this context all of the treatment parameters are equal: average treatment effect, 
treatment on the treated, and treatment on the untreated.
17  See Heckman et al. (1998) and Abadie and Imbens (2006) for methodological details and 
large sample properties of matching estimators.Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 2 378
Given that the selectivity of the Comuna Segura program can be controlled, 
we can get the impact of the program through ordinary least squares (OLS) es-
timation; however, we are assuming a specific functional form on the outcome 
equations which enables us to run OLS regressions. So, the logical next step 
would be to relax this assumption enabling a nonparametric version of this 
impact. that is exactly what matching does, providing a test for the robustness 
of the results.
4.1.  Parametric Estimates
Considering the above-mentioned the simplest empirical specification for 
evaluating the effects of the program is as follows:
(3)   YC u ij ii j =+ + αβ
where Yij represents the difference (2001-2002) of the crime reporting frequen-
cy of municipality i for the crime j per 100,000 inhabitants and Ci is a dummy 
variable with a value of 1 when the municipality participates in the Comuna 
Segura program and 0 if it does not. therefore, the OLS parameter β provides 
a measure of the program’s effect. If this parameter is positive, it would indicate 
that crime reporting frequency rates of municipality i for the crime j are higher, 
conditional on its participation in the program. For those crimes whose dark 
figure is high, that is, whose reporting rate is significantly lower than the real 
crime rate, this positive value will be the proof that the program is achieving 
the stated objective of encouraging citizens to report crimes. As was discussed 
above (see equation 1), if the program does not have a positive effect on the 
crime rate, then this program’s positive impact on the reporting rate represents 
a decrease in the dark figure. this situation can be seen in crimes such as theft, 
aggravated theft and theft with force, where the dark figure was significant. Now, 
in crimes such as homicide and rape, where the dark figure is close to zero, 
the impact of the program on reporting is not to reduce the dark figure, but to 
lower the criminality rate. therefore, in that context, the negative impact of the 
program on the reporting rate could reflect a decrease in crime.
table 3 shows the estimates obtained from the model specification in (3). 
the program positively affects reporting of several types of crime18. We can 
particularly note a positive and significant impact on theft and theft with force. 
On the other hand, the program negatively affected rape reporting.
Nevertheless, the previous specification does not consider some factors that 
could affect crime reporting frequency rates beyond the effects of the program. 
therefore, the following specification controls for potentially relevant charac-
teristics when evaluating the impact of the program:
(4)   YC xu ij ii ji j =+ + ′ + αβ γ
18  In the case of “theft” participation in the Comuna Segura program leads to an almost 
400% increase in crime reporting rates per 100,000 inhabitants.Anti-Crime Programs: … / J. M. Benavente, D. Contreras, R. Montero 379
where  ′ xij  represents a vector of socioeconomic characteristics on a municipal 
level. the CASEN 2000 survey was used to create those controls. According to 
the literature, the covariates selected are the following: quintile ratios, percentage 
of non-attendance to educational institutions, unemployment rate, per capita 
income (standardized by its median), a Penal Reform Process dummy variable, 
and population density. the quintile ratio variable, an income inequality indicator, 
shows the possible effects of unequal income distribution on the crimes observed. 
this rests on the premise that worse income distributions would increase social 
tensions and thus promote crime. the percentage of non-attendance to educational 
institutions attempts to capture school drop-out rates caused by the opportunity 
cost connected to the profitability of illegal activities. the unemployment rate 
attempts to measure the economic environment and the lack of opportunities 
in the formal labor markets. Per capita income captures the municipal poverty 
indices and how these affect the crime rate. the Penal Reform Process dummy 
variable controls for the possible effects of the penal reform process that had 
already been implemented in some regions of the country.19 Finally, the popu-
lation density variable measures municipal housing and the possible effects of 
this on the crime indices as population concentrations increase.
table 4 shows the results when estimating equation (4) by traditional para-
metric methods while controlling for potentially relevant characteristics which 
might affect crime reporting rates. the results remain stable at least for theft 
and rape. In other words, there are positive effects (similar to the previous ones) 
associated with the program that remains after control variables are included.
Given that we have worked with the dependant variable in difference, we 
believe it is pertinent to evaluate the same specification (4) using the controls in 
19  these regions are Antofagasta, Atacama, Coquimbo, Del Maule and La Araucanía.
tABLE 3
IMPACt EVALUAtION, PARAMEtRIC (WItHOUt CONtROLS)



























N 94 94 94 94 94
R2 0.04 0.005 0.01 0.03 0.0008
Notes:  Standard error in parenthesis. *: significant at 10%, **: significant at 5%, ***: significant 
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differences, which allows us to control for fixed effects on a municipal level20. 
We have used the CASEN survey for years 1998 and 2000 for this and obtained 
the 1998-2000 difference for the control variables: quintile ratios, percentage 
of non-attendance to educational institutions, unemployment rate, per capita 
income (standardized by its median), a Penal reform process dummy variable, 
and population density.
table 5 shows the results of this specification. the estimated effects are robust 
to this new model, again for theft and rape. this provides us with clear evidence 
20  Consider the existence of a fixed effect influencing the municipal crime reporting rates 
in the period t:
  DC xh u ijt it ijt ij ijt ′′ =+ + ′ ++ αβ γδ
 where  D represents the crime reporting rates in the period t and hij is the fixed effect. the 
same non-observable fixed factor would be present in the time t’:
  ′ =+ ′ + ′′ ++ ′ DC xh u ijt it ijt ij ijt αβ γδ
  thus, taking away both specifications, we remove said fixed effect:
  ∆∆ ∆∆ DY Cx u ij ij ii ji j == + ′ + γ
  which is the model that we finally estimate.
tABLE 4
IMPACt EVALUAtION, PARAMEtRIC (WItH COVARIAtES)
(Dependant variable: difference in crime reporting rates per 100,000 inhabitants, 2002-2001)
theft Aggravated   
theft






















% of non attendance at 

































































N 87 87 87 87 87
R2 0.06 0.27 0.18 0.07 0.05
Notes:  Standard error in parenthesis. *: significant at 10%, **: significant at 5%, ***: significant 
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of the positive and significant effects of the program on the municipal crime 
reporting rates for theft. On the other hand, the program negatively affected the 
rape reporting rate, which can be seen as a decrease in the rate of this crime.
As can be seen throughout these three specifications, the variable that identifies 
those municipalities with the penal reform process has a significant and positive 
effect on the crime-reporting rate (aggravated theft and theft with force), which 
is interesting in terms of the signaling role that the reform seems to have played. 
this could be interpreted as an increase in trust by the community in reporting 
crimes, since the reform has a facilitating role in judicial processes. In addition, 
we do not found any effect of unemployment on crime reporting rates21.
4.2.  Non-parametric Estimates
the OLS estimates identify the impact of participating in the Comuna 
Segura program, assuming a homogeneous treatment effect, that selectivity to 
the program is based on observables (which is, in this case, entirely reasonable), 
21  Additionally, the same estimates were then carried out using the per capita amount of 
resources assigned to the Comuna Segura program as explicative variables considering 
the positive and significant effect of the program.
tABLE 5
IMPACt EVALUAtION, PARAMEtRIC (WItH COVARIAtES IN DIFFERENCE)
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N 86 86 86 86 86
R2 0.06 0.25 0.17 0.13 0.03
Notes:  Standard error in parenthesis. *: significant at 10%, **: significant at 5%, ***: significant 
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and that the outcome equations are well specified. this estimation identifies 
the average treatment effect, the treatment on the untreated (TUT), and the 
treatment on the treated (TUT). All of them are equal. In order to evaluate the 
robustness of the results, we have implemented the matching estimators, which 
is a nonparametric way to estimate the effect of the program. therefore, we do 
not impose a functional form and select the most comparable municipalities 
through the propensity score. However, here again, the treatment parameters 
are all the same22.
We then implement the cross-section matching estimators that compare 
the results (differences in crime reporting rates) of the treatment and control 
groups at some moment after the implementation. Specifically, the following 
two estimators shall be applied: (1) the cross-section matching estimator of the 
nearest neighbor, (2) the cross-section matching estimator kernel.
In order to matching works we must establish the following standard 
assumptions:








the first condition randomizes C with respect to outcomes (unconfounded-
ness assumption), and second assures comparing comparable municipalities. 
the common support condition is also necessary.
the first step is to estimate the propensity score or conditional prob-
ability of participating in the program23. this estimate allows us to reduce 
the dimensionality of the determinants to carry out the matching; therefore 
EYPP Ww (, () ) == 0  is estimated instead of EYPW w (, ) == 0 . to estimate 
the propensity score, it is necessary to select a set of W characteristics as 
explanatory variables. It is crucial to restrict the selection of W to variables 
not influenced by the program; otherwise the program itself would bias the 
estimates. this potential problem is eliminated when considering the municipal 
characteristics of 1998 and 2000.
table 6 shows the probit model estimated for the probability of being selected 
for the Comuna Segura program. the same controls used in the original model 
are used as the determinants of the probability of being selected in the program. 
As may be observed, the only significant variables are the unemployment rate 
and aggravated theft reporting rates. However, other variables could be not sta-
tistically significant because they had a high degree of multicollineality, which 
would affect the efficiency of the estimation. Moreover, the model presents a 
good degree of adjustment, since the coefficient of determination (R2) is 22%, 
which is positive for the pairing process in the matching implementation. We 
22  the literature has established kernel PMS estimates may produce more efficient estimates 
than nearest neighbor PSM estimates. 
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would like to have a model with a better degree of adjustment, but given the data 
only these variables are available and, thus, it is not possible to further increase 
the coefficient of determination. As mentioned above, two matching estimators 
will be employed; that of the nearest neighbor, and the Kernel method.
the nearest neighbor is the simplest estimator to implement. It is first 
necessary to determine how many neighbors shall be utilized. the neighbors 
are subsequently selected in accordance with their proximity to the treatment 
group (propensity score) in terms of Euclidian distance. However, one of the 
problems of this method is that all the clones (control group matches) receive 
the same weighting. For instance, if there are five neighbors near the experi-
mental individual, then the second and third neighbor receive exactly the same 
weighting. A kernel regression estimator chooses the weights so that the obser-
vations nearest the individual treatment group receive the greatest weighting. 
the implementation of the kernel function requires the choice of a bandwidth 
tABLE 6









Per capita income/median  –1.21
(1.62)




theft reporting rate in 2001 (per 100,000 inhabitants) 0.003
(0.004)
Aggravated theft reporting rate in 2001 (per 100,000 inhabitants) 0.01*
(0.007)






Notes:  Standard error in parenthesis. *: significant at 10%, **: significant at 5%, ***: significant 
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(hn) which is analogous to the choice problem of the number of neighbors in 
the nearest neighbor estimator24.
table 7 shows the effect of the program through the matching estimators. 
the results are very interesting. First, the program does not appear to have a 
positive impact on the theft reporting rate. However, now we see a positive and 
significant impact on reporting theft with force. On the other hand, a decrease 
in the rape reporting rate is seen again as the result of the implementation of the 
program, which could be interpreted as a decrease of this type of crime. For the 
other crimes, the effects are not statistically significant. It is worth mentioning 
that, although the results for the Kernel estimator give a bandwidth of 0.06, a 
sensibility analysis was conducted using its different values. the results were 
robust for the different values of bandwidth used.
An essential aspect when matching estimators are implemented is related to 
the balancing property of propensity score. that is, the propensity score should 
construct a control group that exhibits similar characteristics to the group of 
beneficiary municipalities. this validates the comparison to be done between the 
two groups, since it ensures that comparable municipalities are being compared 
and that the clones used are of good quality. table 8 presents the test of mean 
differences for beneficiary and non beneficiary municipalities for each of the 
variables incorporated in the probit model. One can see that for each variable, 
it is not rejected for the beneficiary and non beneficiary municipalities to have 
the same average value.
the estimations carried out so far show two things clearly. First that the 
reporting rate increased in those municipalities that participated in the program, 
specifically in the theft category. this indicates a positive citizen propensity to 
report crimes. this is in line with the spirit of the Comuna Segura program, 
24  With regard to the bandwidth choice, it is advisable to carry out a sensibility analysis for 
the different values of hn.
tABLE 7
IMPACt EVALUAtION, NON PARAMEtRIC
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which can be summed up as the creation (or utilization) of information networks 
that promote among an atmosphere that is conducive to crime reporting on a 
local basis. People feel protected and trust public mechanisms. Secondly, there 
is a negative effect on rape reporting, which can be interpreted as a decrease in 
the occurrence of rape given the low dark figure. this impact may be due to the 
dissuasive effect created by the program. this does not happen with homicides, 
basically because homicides are probably more driven by other more extreme 
phenomena not related by interventions that have a community component.
the estimations presented so far may be biased due to the violation of the 
unconfoundedness assumption (Knutsson and tilley, 2009). Indeed, the benefits 
associated with participating in the program could be affecting contiguous mu-
nicipalities that were not participants. In other words, the effects of the program 
might have been projected toward other non beneficiary municipalities, which 
would bias the results presented so far. the effects of spatial displacement are 
held because, if the transport expenses are not prohibitive (which they were not, 
at least until 2002), criminals could move from one place to another, biasing the 
estimate of the program’s effects. On the other hand, the benefits associated with 
the crime control may be dispersed to other municipalities, because contiguous 
municipalities could be positively affected (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). 
therefore, in order to analyze the robustness of our results based on those two 
potential problems, two complementary exercises were carried out. First, the 
effects of the program were estimated again, without taking into account non 
beneficiary municipalities that were contiguous to the beneficiaries. In other 







Quintile ratio 12.23 17.59 0.4
% of non attendance at school 
(5-18 years old) 8.16 7.62 0.54
Unemployment rate 0.13 0.12 0.61
Per capita income/median  1.52 1.89 0.31
Municipality with Reforma Procesal Penal 0.18 0.18 1.00
Population density 5,113.6 8,088.3 0.28
theft reporting rate in 2001 
(per 100,000 inhabitants) 90.50 87.00 0.93
Aggravated theft reporting rate in 2001 
(per 100,000 inhabitants) 74.54 109.99 0.27
theft with force reporting rate in 2001 
(per 100,000 inhabitants) 151.67 187.73 0.52Estudios de Economía, Vol. 38 - Nº 2 386
a fictitious program was made, which assumed that the contiguous non benefi-
ciaries municipalities were actually the beneficiary ones.
table 9 presents the parametric estimates using level controls and excluding 
non beneficiary municipalities that were contiguous. For this group of estimates, 
the negative and significant impact of the program on rape reporting stands out. 
It also shows that the program had a positive impact on the reporting of theft 
with force. However, there are no other significant impacts observed, even the 
expected effects for crimes such as theft and aggravated thefts. Just as in the 
previous estimations, we should take into account the efficiency problems re-
lated to the small sample, which could affect the statistical significance of the 
impacts on each type of crime. table 10 confirms the previous estimation using 
controls in differences, with the aim of controlling for the existence of fixed 
effects. As one can see, the program significantly increases the theft reporting 
rate. It again shows a decrease in rape reporting, which has been very robust 
throughout all the estimations. table 11 presents the impact estimates of the 
program using the matching estimator; theft and rape exhibit the same effects 
found previously. However, it now shows a positive and significant effect on 
aggravated theft.
tABLE 9
IMPACt EVALUAtION, PARAMEtRIC (WItH COVARIAtES)
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N 72 72 72 72 72
R2 0.06 0.29 0.19 0.10 0.05
Notes:  Standard error in parenthesis. *: significant at 10%, **: significant at 5%, ***: significant 
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tABLE 10
IMPACt EVALUAtION, PARAMEtRIC (WItH COVARIAtES IN DIFFERENCE)
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N 71 71 71 71 71
R2 0.06 0.25 0.16 0.12 0.05
Notes:  Standard error in parenthesis. *: significant at 10%, **: significant at 5%, ***: significant 
at 1%.
tABLE 11
IMPACt EVALUAtION, NON PARAMEtRIC
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tABLE 12
IMPACt EVALUAtION OF tHE “FAKE” PROGRAM, NON PARAMEtRIC



























Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. Bandwidth for kernel is 0.06.
Since the benefits related to the crime control in some municipalities can 
positively affect those that are geographically close, but have not been selected 
for the program as mentioned by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), it is pertinent 
to run an estimate using a faked population. thus we proceeded to reestimate 
all the impacts, but while considering the beneficiary municipalities to be those 
that are contiguous to the actual participants. the impact that this false program 
should have is null and that is precisely what the estimates reveal in table 12. the 
evidence indicates that the benefits of the program were not significantly propa-
gated into the neighboring municipalities and, therefore, the estimation strategy 
used is not biased and allows us to identify the impacts of the program.
there is one more exercise to complete. the program started off in twelve 
municipalities nationwide in March 2001: El Bosque, La Pintana, Lo Espejo, 
Renca, Santiago, San Bernardo, Copiapó, Coronel, Ovalle, San Pedro, Valdivia 
and Valparaíso. However in 2002, using the same selection criteria, the program 
was expanded to twelve other municipalities: Cerro Navia, Estación Central, 
Macul, Pudahuel, San Miguel, San Ramón, Melipilla, Calama, Linares, San 
Antonio, Talca and Talcahuano. therefore, the best municipality control is those 
that were beneficiaries of the program during the first trimester of 2002 are 
those that had been enrolled previously. thus, we reestimate the impact of the 
program, in a parametric way, using only this reduced group of municipalities. 
table 13 presents the results. there is no doubt that we have a serious problem 
of efficiency, because there are so few observations, however, the associated 
signs are again the ones expected. Moreover, in the case of rape a negative and 
significant effect is seen, which is consistent with all the estimations previously 
carried out. Incorporating covariates the results remain robust, but as there are 
very little degrees of freedom, it was chosen not to present these estimates.
As mentioned above, the Comuna Segura program started in 2001 and ended in 
2006.therefore, there are six years data. In this context, the natural exercise would 
be to evaluate the effect of the program on a longer term scale – the trajectory 
of reporting from the year 2003. What has been identified so far are short term Anti-Crime Programs: … / J. M. Benavente, D. Contreras, R. Montero 389
impacts, due to the immediate effect of the program on the municipal reporting 
rates. However, it should be analyzed if this positive effect persisted over time. 
Now, when the variation is used on the reporting rate, for example during the 
period of 2001-2003, the identified beneficial effects disappear (see table 14). 
this attests that the program, which had a positive effect in the beginning, was 
not capable of significantly altering the trajectory of the reporting rates in the 
long term. there are two potential interpretations to this result: the program 
does not create the social network needed, or the social network created is very 
weak and would need additional inputs to continue to work.
tABLE 13
IMPACt EVALUAtION USING “NAtURAL CONtROLS”, PARAMEtRIC  
(WItHOUt CONtROLS)


























N 24 24 24 24 24
R2 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.18 0.00
Notes:  Standard error in parenthesis. *: significant at 10%, **: significant at 5%, ***: significant 
at 1%.
tABLE 14
LONG RUN IMPACt EVALUAtION, NON PARAMEtRIC
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5.  Conclusions
this paper provides evidence on the effects of the Comuna Segura program 
on municipal crime reporting rates. the estimates show clear and significant 
results for the cases of theft and rape. Indeed, the beneficiary municipalities of 
the program exhibit an increase in theft reporting rates. this is consistent with 
the fact that there is a large dark figure, because the victims are less likely to 
report. On the other hand, the estimates show that the program had a negative 
effect on rape reporting. As the dark figures of this type of crime are relatively 
low, the negative impact of the program may be related to a decrease in this type 
of the crime, which would be due to the dissuasive effect of the program. It is 
interesting to discuss why this does not happen with homicides, which also has 
low dark figure. A possible explanation for that is because probably rapes are 
more affected by interventions that have a community component. On the other 
hand, homicides are probably more driven by other more extreme phenomena; 
in fact, Loayza et al. (2002) present evidence that homicides seem to be less 
responsive to economic incentives.
the results allow us to present a more objective picture on the real impact of 
the Comuna Segura program, where positive effects related to the implementation 
could be seen. this reveals the importance of conducting rigorous procedures 
to evaluate public policies, even in a context of few resources. However the fi-
nancial issues are very important too and it is necessary to take them in account 
in order to make a fair statement about the cost-effectiveness of the program. 
this point is not tackled in this paper but it must be keeps in mind to have a 
complete picture of this program.
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APPENDIx
Definition of crimes
Homicide and Patricide: A person, who in full knowledge of the relationship 
that ties them kills a father, mother or child, be they legitimate or illegitimate, 
any other ascendant or descendant or their spouse, shall be tried with the crime 
of patricide. A person, who kills another in any other circumstance, shall be 
tried for homicide.
Rape: Defined as having sexual contact with a woman in the following circums-
tances: (i) when force or intimidation is used, (ii) when the woman is deprived 
of her reason or senses by any cause, (iii) when she is less than twelve years of 
age, even when none of the above applies.
Theft: Aggravated theft occurs when a person takes another’s property with 
violence or intimidation against people or property without the consent of the 
owner and with the goal of personal gain; when violence, intimidation and force 
is absent, it is considered simply theft. Violence or intimidation against people 
exists when there are damages, threats to handover or provide things, either to 
block resistance or opposition to the removal of objects, or any other act that 
may intimidate or force a person to provide or handover an object. It is also 
considered violence when a person claims to possess orders from an authority, 
or purports to be a judge or public official.